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IN THE 1990'S THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE A
REASONABLE PERSON IN ITS WORKPLACES: THE





Though the notion of "sovereign immunity" would seem associated
with royalty, the doctrine was applied by federal courts as a total tort
shield for the federal government.' If one were injured by the federal
government, no matter how grievous its fault, the sole remedy was to
have Congress introduce and pass a private claim bill granting the injured
individual relief. 2 This remedy was used by both civilians and military
personnel.
At the end of World War II Congress was deluged with private claim
bills. In response, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
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D.C. He obtained his B.A. summa cum laude from Boston University in 1962. He received
his J.D. magna cum laude from Columbia University in 1965. Mr. Schwartz was Chairman
of the Working Task Force of the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability and
Chairman of the Federal Interagency Council on Insurance, and is the drafter of the Uniform
Product Liability Act. He is co-author of W. PROSSER, J. WADE AND V. SCHWARTZ, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (8th ed. 1988), author of V. ScHWARTZ, Com'ARATIvE NEGLIGENCE
(2d ed. 1986), co-author of V. SCHWAARTZ, P. LEE AND K. KELLY, GUmE To MtLTISTATE
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1. See Oxborn v. United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824); W. PROSSER & P. KEETON,
TORTS, 1033 (4th ed. 1984).
2. See JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAims § 21 (1988).
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in 1946.3 The FTCA constituted a significant change in public policy;
Congress abolished total sovereign immunity, but the "repealer" came
grudgingly. Congress put in place limits on liability that are not available
to private defendants. For example, Congress exempted the federal gov-
ernment from punitive damages. 4 Moreover, Congress sharply limited the
amount of plaintiff attorneys' contingent fees to 25 percent in litigated
and 20 percent in settled cases. 5.This limitation discourages plaintiffs'
attorneys from suing the United States in contexts where another defendant
is available. Furthermore, Congress made a jury trial unavailable. 6 Many
plaintiffs' lawyers believe that a jury (as contrasted with a judge) is the
best fountain to gusher forth damages for pain and suffering. Congress
also, at least as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, shielded
the federal government from strict liability. 7 In addition, Congress excluded
specific types of claims."
The topic of this article is a key exclusion known as the "discretionary
function exception." 9 This FTCA exclusion is the most important of the
exclusions; it is also the most amorphous. The purpose of the discretionary
function exception was to prevent judicial interference in major govern-
mental policymaking. Unfortunately, it has become a liability shield for
serious acts of government negligence-acts that do not involve major
public policy decisions. Many of these serious harms occur in workplaces
that the federal government owns, operates, or controls. Curiously, when
legislators have proposed amendments to overcome this problem in the
Act, the Department of Justice has defended the status quo based on cost,
not the need for the government to make decisions on public policy. ' The
purpose of this article is to demonstrate that it would be sound public
policy for Congress to clarify the discretionary function exception and
make clear that the government has no "discretion" to negligently expose
its workers or others to harmful chemicals and substances.
3. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946). The legislative history explains the
objective of the Act: "To relieve Congress and the President from a substantial part of the
burden of these 2,000 private claim bills appearing in each Congress would plainly aid our
war effort." H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1942).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1982).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
7. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
8. Congress specifically excluded claims relating to certain governmental activities
(e.g., loss or miscarriage of postal matter, collection of taxes and customs duty, detention
of goods by law enforcement officers, fiscal operations of the Treasury) and claims stemming
from particular types of torts (e.g., assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prose-
cution, libel, slander). 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982).
10. See Hearing before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-17 (1988)
(statement by Brent 0. Hatch, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice).
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BACKGROUND TO THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
While opening the door to ordinary common law tort suits, Congress
did not want to allow the threat of lawsuits to "handicap efficient
government operations."" As suggested, Congress designed the discretion-
ary function exception to protect against unwarranted judicial intrusion
into governmental acts in making major policy decisions.' 2 Congress'
concern was that lawsuits challenging governmental policy determinations
would impede the federal government's ability to function.
Congress designed the discretionary function exception to protect the
federal government's policymaking decisions against impediment by law-
suits in two ways. First, Congress precluded claims based upon an act or
omission of an employee of the government exercising due care in the
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation is valid. Second, Congress precluded claims based upon the
performance or failure to perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee, whether or not the discretion
involved is abused.' 3 In particular, the second aspect of the exception
focuses on protecting major policy judgments made by federal government
officials acting in administrative or regulatory capacities. In the statutory
language of the discretionary function exception, Congress sought to
prevent courts from second-guessing policy decisions of that type.'
4
Although lacking in detail, the materials that comprise the Act's
legislative history further explain Congress' intent in enacting the discre-
tionary function exception. In a report accompanying the bill, the House
Judiciary Committee explained:
It is also designed to preclude application of the bill to a claim
against a regulatory agency, such as the Federal Trade Commission
or the Securities and Exchange Commission, based upon an alleged
abuse of discretionary authority by an officer or employee, whether
or not negligence is alleged to have been involved. To take another
example, claims based upon an allegedly negligent exercise by the
Treasury Department of the blacklisting or freezing powers are
also intended to be excepted. The bill is not intended to authorize
11. See United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
12. See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 506, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984); Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
13. The text of the discretionary function exception reads as follows:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of
a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
14. See JAYsON, supra note 1, at § 245.
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a suit for damages to test the validity of or provide a remedy on
account of such discretionary acts even though negligently per-
formed and involving an abuse of discretion. Nor is it desirable
or intended that the constitutionality of legislation or the legality
of a rule or regulation should be tested through the medium of a
damage suit for tort. However, the common-law torts of employees
of regulatory agencies would be included within the scope of the
bill to the same extent as torts of nonregulatory agencies. Thus,
section 402(5) and (10), exempting claims arising from the admin-
istration of the Trading With the Enemy Act or the fiscal opera-
tions of the Treasury, are not intended to exclude such common-
law torts as an automobile collision caused by the negligence of
an employee of the Treasury Department or other Federal agency
administering those functions.' 5
DEVELOPING THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION IMMUNITY SHIELD
Interpretation of the discretionary function exception by courts has
run a less than even course. The struggle centered around defining the
type of governmental activity that would be regarded as discretionary.
Early court decisions attempted to distinguish between governmental ac-
tivities at the planning level and governmental activities at the operational
level.' 6 In two leading opinions, the United States Supreme Court utilized
this distinction for defining what was a discretionary function.
Dalehite v. United States-Planning v. Operational Rule
Dalehite v. United States 7 involved a claim against the United States
for deaths resulting from an explosion in 1947 on two ships harbored at
Texas City, Texas. The ships were loaded with tons of fertilizer to be
shipped abroad as part of a government program to increase the food
supply in areas under military occupation following World War II. The
fertilizer was produced at government-owned facilities operated by private
contractors. The federal government developed a detailed set of specifi-
cations and sent the specifications to each plant. These government spec-
ifications required that the primary ingredient in the fertilizer be ammonium
nitrate, a component used in explosives.
After the catastrophe, hundreds of claims were brought. Plaintiffs
contended that the United States was negligent in utilizing ammonium
15. H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5-6 (1945); see also H. R. Rep.
No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1942) (same statement in House Judiciary Committee
Report on an earlier bill); S. Rep. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 7 (1942) (same
statement in a Senate Judiciary Committee Report on an earlier bill).
16. See JAYsoN, supra note 1, at § 249.01.
17. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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nitrate, a chemical known to have explosive properties when blended with
other chemicals in the fertilizer. 8
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
found that the government committed four specific acts of negligence: (1)
using a formula composed of a substance which made the fertilizer highly
susceptible to fire or explosion, (2) directing that the fertilizer be sacked
in bags made from paper or other substances which were easily ignited,
(3) packing the bags at high degrees of temperature, which rendered the
fertilizer more susceptible to fire and explosion, and (4) failing to label
and mark the sacks of fertilizer as dangerous explosives and fire hazards
as required by the Rules and Regulations of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
The United States Supreme Court held that the allegedly culpable acts
were all made at a planning rather than operational level and that the acts
"involved considerations more or less important to the practicability of
the Government's fertilizer program."' 19 The Court focused on the fact
that "the acts found to have been negligent were thus performed under
the direction of a plan developed at a high level under a direct delegation
of plan-making authority from the apex of the Executive Department. The
establishment of this Plan, delegated to the Field Director's Office ...
clearly required the exercise of expert judgment. '20 Thus, the Supreme
Court's decision relied primarily on the fact that the negligent acts involved
"planning" as opposed to carrying out plans, but the decision also seemed
to rely on the status of the actors.
Dalehite's policy/operational distinction did not put the issue to rest.
Lower courts continued to wrestle with putting negligent acts of govern-
ment officials into categories of "policy" versus "operational." Thirty-
three years later, the United States Supreme Court took on the issue again.
United States v. Varig Airlines-Shielding the Regulators
In July of 1973, a commercial jet aircraft owned by S.A. Empresa Ce
Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense ("Varig Airlines") was flying from Rio de
Janeiro to Paris when a fire broke out in one of the aft lavatories, causing
124 of the plane's 135 passengers to die from asphyxiation or the effects
of toxic gases. Varig Airlines brought an action for damages to the
destroyed aircraft against the United States under the FTCA. The families
and personal representatives of many of the passengers brought a separate
action under the FTCA for wrongful death. Both claims alleged that the
Civil Aeronautics Agency ("CAA") had been negligent when it inspected
the Boeing 707 and issued a type certificate to an aircraft that did not
comply with CAA fire protection standards. 2'
18. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 23 (1953).
19. Id. at 42.
20. Id. at 39-40.
21. The Civil Aeronautics Agency was the predecessor to the Federal Aviation Ad-
19891
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In a consolidated action, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California granted summary judgment for the United
States on the grounds that California law did not recognize an actionable
tort duty for inspection and certification activities, and that even if there
were such a cause of action, recovery was barred by the discretionary
function exception. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed on the basis that inspection of aircraft for compliance
with air safety regulations is not a function entailing the sort of policy-
making discretion contemplated by the discretionary function exception.
2 2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In a separate incident in October of 1968, a DeHavilland Dove aircraft
developed a fire in midair and crashed, killing its pilot, copilot, and two
passengers. The owner of the aircraft filed an action against the United
States under the FTCA. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of California found that the crash resulted from defects in the
installation of a gasoline line, and concluded that the federal government
was negligent in issuing a supplemental-type certificate for an installation
that did not comply with FAA safety regulations. 23 Following appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the issue whether the government could be
subject to liability for the negligence of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion in issuing a supplemental-type certificate.
24
In an opinion on the two cases, the United States Supreme Court
expressed its adherence to the Dalehite decision and set out two factors
to be used in determining when the discretionary function exception
protects the acts of a federal government employee from liability:
First, it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the
actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception
applies in a given case .... Thus, the basic inquiry concerning
the application of the discretionary function exception is whether
the challenged acts of a Government employee-whatever his or
her rank-are of the nature and quality that Congress intended to
shield from tort liability.
Second, whatever else the discretionary function exception may
include, it plainly was intended to encompass the discretionary
acts of the Government acting in its role as a regulator of the
conduct of private individuals.
25
ministration. Under the Federal Aviation Act and FAA regulations, the FAA has responsi-
bility for certifying new types of aircraft. 49 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (1982); 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.11-
21.53 (1980). The type certificate, which must be obtained anytime a new type of aircraft
is introduced, certifies that the aircraft's designs, plans, specifications, and performance
data conform with minimum safety standards.
22. 692 F.2d 1205, 1208-1209 (9th Cir. 1982).
23. A supplemental type certificate must be obtained if an aircraft is altered by the
introduction of a major change in its type design. 14 C.F.R. § 21.113 (1980).
24. 461 U.S. 925 (1983).
25. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813-14 (1984).
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Applying these two factors, the Supreme Court held that the discre-
tionary function exception immunizes the federal government from tort
liability based upon the conduct of the FAA, or its predecessor the CAA,
in certifying aircraft for use in commercial aviation. 26 The Court observed:
Judicial intervention in such decisionmaking through private tort
suits would require the courts to 'second-guess' the political, social,
and economic judgments of an agency exercising its regulatory
function. It was precisely this sort of judicial intervention in
policymaking that the discretionary function exception was de-
signed to prevent.
2 1
Unfortunately, courts have seized upon the Dalehite and Varig opinions
to immunize the federal government's negligent conduct where executive,
broad, public policymaking "discretion" was not involved. The Supreme
Court attempted to draw the line at agencies' determinations as to the
manner of enforcing or implementing their regulations. As subsequent
cases show, particularly in the context of occupational safety, this line is
not clear.
THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION IMMUNITY SHIELD-AN EXCUSE FOR
GOVERNMENT DISREGARD OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
Shuman v. United States-Let's Have Even More Leeway for Negligence
The discretionary function exception to the FTCA has helped the
federal government avoid tort liability for what has been proven, in court,
to be a negligent exposure of workers at Navy shipyards to asbestos
products.
As early as the 1930's, the federal government was aware of the
hazards of asbestos and consequently, the government had imposed re-
gulations for the safe handling of asbestos products.2 During the mobi-
lization efforts of World War II, however, these regulations and
recommended protective measures for the safe handling of asbestos in
Navy shipyards were largely ignored.
29
In Shuman v. United States,'0 a shipyard worker's wife brought claims
against the United States for asbestos-induced injuries that led to her
26. Id. at 815-16.
27. Id. at 820.
28, The Surgeon General of the Navy, in his 1939 Annual Report, concluded that
further research into the hazards of asbestos and strict compliance with recommended
protective measures were necessary to protect the safety and health of workers. He asked
that asbestos pipe covering and insulation work be designated a "hazardous occupation."
Annual Report of the Surgeon General, U.S. Navy, Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and
Surgery, to the Secretary of the Navy Concerning Statistics of the Disease and Injuries in
the United States Navy For the Calendar Year 1939, at 24-25 (1941).
29. See ARTABANE & BAUMER, DEFUSING THE ASBESTOS LITIGATION CRISIS: THE RE-
SPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, 16-17 (1986).
30. 765 F.2d 283 (1st Cir. 1985).
1989)
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husband's death. George Shuman worked as a shipfitter at a Navy shipyard
during part of 1942 and from 1951-53. 31 Plaintiff contended that in this
work, her husband was regularly exposed to high levels of asbestos dust,
that respirators were not worn, and that the government did not provide
adequate ventilation to areas where asbestos products were utilized. The
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts agreed.3 2 In
finding that the federal government was negligent in exposing private
shipyard workers to asbestos hazards, and in failing to provide adequate
warnings to those workers, the district court's specific findings of fact
established that the Navy was aware of the health hazards posed by
asbestos dust and that the Navy had created minimum requirements for
the safe handling of asbestos in the Navy's shipyards.
3
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed.
Specifically, the First Circuit held that the determination whether and at
what time the government should have undertaken a duty to warn the
private shipyard workers under contract with the government about the
hazards of working with asbestos was a matter that falls within the
protection of the discretionary function exception. 34 The First Circuit held
that lack of a federal government policy to warn workers of a work
hazard is a discretionary act. 35 Despite the district court's finding of
government knowledge of the dangers of asbestos, the First Circuit stated:
[T]he omission of regulations and an enforcement apparatus de-
signed to minimize occupational hazards in the shipyards was a
31. In 1952, private shipyards contracted with the government for the construction of
naval vessels. The government had representatives on site who were part of the supervisor
of shipbuilding's staff.
32. Shuman v. United States, 765 F.2d 283, 285 (Ist Cir. 1985).
33. The District Court made the following findings of fact:
(1) Navy inspectors from the Supervisor of Shipbuilding's staff inspected areas of
the Shipyard in which asbestos and asbestos dust was open and obvious;
(2) upper echelon Navy officials knew at least as early as 1940, and probably
earlier, that asbestos dust posed a significant health hazard;
(3) this information, including the fact finding studies that were performed, was
disseminated through a number of channels;
(4) in 1943, after Shuman's first period of work at the Shipyard, the Navy
promulgated a document entitled "Minimum Requirements for Safety and
Industrial Health in Contract Shipyards," which dealt in part with the hazards
of asbestos dust;
(5) the "Secretary of the Navy stated that he expected 'full and complete com-
pliance' with the Minimum Requirements" and imposed these standards on
Shipyards operating under Navy contracts as well as on the Navy's own yards."
Id. at 285-86.
34. Id. at 291.
35. Id. at 290, 292. Plaintiff argued that under the Walsh-Healey Act, the government
was under a duty to warn plaintiff's husband that to engage in work requiring the use of
asbestos was dangerous or hazardous to his health and safety. Id. at 290, citing Walsh-
Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. § 35(e) (1982). The First Circuit rejected this claim, holding that the
Walsh-Healey Act did not impose explicit, enforceable obligations on the government running
to employees of government contractors. Id. at 290-91.
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matter of administrative, and perhaps even legislative, discretion
protected by the discretionary function exception. Similarly, the
Navy decision to provide technical inspectors on site to test for
quality control and adherence to government plans and specifica-
tions, and not to provide inspectors with authority for promoting
or ensuring the safety and health of the government contractor's
employees, was a matter of protected discretion
6
Somehow a nondecision by the federal government, concerning the per-
formance of a government contract at a Navy shipyard, was elevated to
the high level policy function that Congress intended to free from the
threat of tort suits.
Dube v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp.-A Switch in Policy: No Discretion
for Nondecisions
In Dube v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp.,37 also a case involving asbestos
products, four asbestos products manufacturers sought contribution from
the United States Government for amounts that the manufacturers paid
in settling the claims of a Navy shipyard employee's daughter. The United
States District Court for the District of Maine found that the plaintiff,
Joan Dube, died from mesothelioma caused by exposure to asbestos dust
that her father inadvertently brought home on his clothing from the time
Joan was nine years old in 1959 until she left home upon her marriage in
1973. Her father was employed at a Navy shipyard as an insulator or pipe
coverer. The United States Navy owned and operated the shipyard and
employed civilian workers such as Joan Dube's father.
The United States District Court for the District of Maine found that
the federal government was one third responsible for Joan Dube's damages
because the government had been aware of the risks of working with
asbestos since 1964, had no policies either before or after 1964 to warn
or protect household members of employees of its shipyards from asbestos
exposure, and provided no warnings to either employees or the household
members. Nonetheless, the district court held that the government was not
liable for any of Joan Dube's damages, reasoning that the discretionary
function exception protected the government from liability because the
decision not to protect household members, although not made by the
government, was "susceptible" of discretion. Furthermore, the United
States District Court for the District of Maine held that the federal
government's failure to properly enforce safety regulations concerning
asbestos fell within the discretionary function exception because the safety
regulations were not intended for protection of household members of
employees at Navy shipyards. Again, the discretionary function exception
36. Id. at 292.
37. No. 83-0224P (D. Me. 1988) (1988 W.L. 64733).
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was stretched to cover a nondecision to ignore safety in a federal govern-
ment workplace.
In a significant switch in policy, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, which earlier issued the Shuman opinion,
reversed the United States District Court for the District of Maine in
Dube. The First Circuit held that the federal government's failure to make
a decision about whether to warn about a danger was not a discretionary
function.
Lively v. United States-Repeated Protection for Government Negligence
in Its Workplaces
Lively v. United States,3" a very recent case, was another controversy
brought by stevedores exposed to asbestos at government shipyards in the
early 1960's involving allegations of government negligence. As in Shuman
and Dube, the plaintiffs argued that the federal government was negligent
in failing to warn shipyard workers of the danger of exposure to asbestos,
and in failing to provide proper equipment to reduce that danger 9 The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana dismissed
the claims holding that they were barred by the discretionary function
exception.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the government's decision to stockpile
asbestos and its decision not to have a safety policy or program for
workers it exposed to asbestos were rooted in policy. The Fifth Circuit
determined, therefore, that the government's decisions were of the "nature
and quality" that Congress sought to protect with the discretionary func-
tion exception.
The Shuman, Dube and Lively cases exemplify that the United States
Supreme Court's opinions in Dalehite and Varig Airlines left the door
open for lower courts to speculate about the government's responsibility
for ordinary negligence in its workplaces. Most of the cases, however,
have favored the federal government. Thus, the government argued suc-
cessfully that its decision not to warn uranium miners of the dangers of
radiation was a "discretionary function. ' 4 The government argued suc-
cessfully that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's failure to warn workers
of possible radiation dangers and failure to adequately protect workers
from radiation exposure were "discretionary functions." '4' And the gov-
ernment argued successfully that its failure to warn about unsafe and
unseaworthy conditions of a vessel it had inspected, and its failure to
require the proper repair of those conditions as well as its failure to direct
38, 870 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1989).
39. Lively v. United States, 870 F.2d 296, 297 (5th Cir. 1989).
40. See Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1950 (9th Cir. 1985).
41. See Sizemore v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 463 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
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a prompt rescue mission were "discretionary functions." 42 Time and time
again, the discretionary function exception has been stretched to allow the
federal government to escape responsibility for its exposure of workers to
risks without adequate protection or instructions.
Recall the fundamental purpose of the discretionary function excep-
tion-to prevent the chilling or disruption of governmental operations and
policymaking. Congress intended to prevent unwarranted judicial intru-
sions into governmental acts in formulating fundamental policy. 4" But
these cases boil down to whether requiring the government to use basic
safety precautions in the workplace can occur without compromising
executive judgment and decisionmaking.
Berkovitz v. United States-The Government Cannot Violate Its Own
Regulatory Standards
In Berkovitz v. United States,44 the United States Supreme Court
placed at least one limit on the scope of the federal government's use of
the discretionary function immunity shield. The Court held that the
government's failure to comply with its own regulations was not protected.
In Berkovitz, the Food and Drug Administration licensed a pharmaceutical
company to produce a particular polio vaccine without first receiving the
required test data. The Supreme Court held that the failure to test all lots
of the vaccine for compliance with safety standards, as required by
regulatory standards, was not a matter of judgment or choice based on
public policy.
4
SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE: SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT BE IMMUNE?
The federal government does not have the same incentives as private
industry to create safety in workplaces that the government controls. First,
the government remains untouched by the sanctions of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration. The federal government is for the most
part exempt from the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA").
46
Although heads of federal agencies are required to establish and maintain
health and safety programs consistent with OSHA standards, 47 there are
no penalities for their failure to do so. When a federal agency violates its




42. See Marine Coal Transport Corp. v, United States, No, 84 Civ. 5265 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (ADS).
43. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
44. 108 S. Ct. 1954, 56 U.S.L.W. 4549 (1988).
45. Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1960-1963 (1988).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (1982),
47. 29 U.S.C. § 668 (1982).
48. Section 3(5) of OSHA excludes from the definition of "employer" public or
government employment. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1982). Thus, the federal government is exempt
from the Act's general health and safety standards, programs and inspections.
Under OSHA, employers who violate the Act's requirements or any OSHA standards
may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. See 29 U.S.C. § 658-659, 666 (1982).
1989]
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As the discretionary function cases demonstrate, tort law, a great
engine to promote safety, also does not place incentives on the government
to keep its workplace safe. When the federal government has endangered
persons in places it owns, creates, or controls, it avoids tort law exposure
by hiding behind the discretionary function immunity shield.
CONCLUSION
The Berkovitz and Dube decisions appear to recognize that the dis-
cretionary function immunity shield should not be allowed to splurge
beyond at least two fundamental barriers: (1) there should be no discretion
for the federal government to violate its own safety regulations, and (2)
the lack of a safety decision is not "discretion."
We would take the process one step further: as we enter the 1990's,
negligent operation of government workplaces that results in harm to
workers is not worthy of protection by the discretionary function immunity
shield. That protection should be reserved for high level executive deci-
sionmaking, as envisioned by Congress in creating the discretionary func-
tion exception. If the federal government is to take a leadership role in
promoting workplace safety, it should assume responsibility for tortious
harms caused by its own negligence.
Legislation that was considered in the 100th Congress 49 and is being
reviewed in the current (101st) Congress 50 can help accomplish this end.
The legislation would clarify that the discretionary function exception does
not shield the federal government against negligence claims where the
federal government either: (1) violated its own occupational safety or
health standards, or (2) was negligent at any workplace it owned, operated,
or had under contract.
The principal argument against these bills is that they will cost too
much. But one must remember all of the tort protections that the federal
49. H.R. 4991 and S. 2709, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
50. H.R. 1095 and S. 464, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). H.R. 1095 and S. 464 provide:
To promote safety and health in workplaces owned, operated or under contract
with the United States by clarifying the United States' obligation to observe
occupational safety and health standards and clarifying United States' responsibility
for harm caused by its negligence at any workplace owned by, operated by, or
under contract with the United States.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. USES OF DEFENSE.
(a) INAPPUCABLITY OF DF PRoVISION.-The limitation on liability of the United
States based upon exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty as provided under section 2680(a) of title 28, United
States Code, shall be inapplicable in any legal or administrative proceeding seeking
damages against the United States in which the plaintiff alleges and proves that
the harm for which the damages are sought was caused by the United States
violation of occupational safety or health standards or which was caused by the
United States negligence at any workplace owned by, operated by, or under
contract with the United States.
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION IMMUNITY
government will still enjoy: for example, no punitive damages, no jury
trials, and no strict liability.' Most importantly, the legislation need not
cost money-if the federal government jeopardizes the health and safety
of persons in workplaces it owns, operates, or controls, the government
will have incentives to avoid liability. There is an old maxim among tort
law specialists: if you do not commit any torts, you do not have to pay
anything.
51. See supra notes 3-7.
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